http://decision.tcc-cci.gc.ca/site/tcc-cci/decisions/en/item/30983/index.do 
McKenzie v. The Queen[1] (October 9, 2012) is a case where the appellant was completely successful at trial and subsequently moved for an enhanced costs award based on a pre-trial offer to the Crown:
[2] The appellant is relying upon her pre-trial written proposal that the matter be settled “on the basis that the respondent consent to judgment allowing the appeal, without costs to either party”.
The motion was dismissed as being made out of time. The most interesting aspect of the decision is the court’s alternative conclusion that there had in fact been no offer of “settlement”:
[11] I do not accept that a proposal to settle on a basis that the appeal be allowed in full without costs, and under threat of seeking substantial indemnity costs if the appeal is allowed by the Court, constitutes a settlement offer for any of these purposes. I am of the view that a settlement offer for these purposes has to involve a degree of compromise. This is supported by such cases as Imperial Oil
Resources Ltd. v. Canada (Attorney General), 2011 FC 652 and
Hine v. Her Majesty The Queen, 2012 TCC 295.
[12] Otherwise, both parties to every appeal would routinely propose that the appeal be allowed or withdrawn without costs, with a view to supporting a claim for increased costs in the event they succeed, and thereby defeating the ordinary rules, practices and considerations applicable to the awarding of costs.
[13] This can create certain difficulties in the context of proposing to settle all-or-nothing cases as discussed by the Federal Court of Appeal in CIBC World Markets Inc. v. Her Majesty the Queen, 2012 FCA 3, and by the Ontario Superior Court of Justice in OMERS Realty Corporation v. Minister of Finance (Costs), 2012 ONSC 159.
[14] In the circumstances of this case, even had the application for increased costs been timely, the settlement offer relied upon does not constitute the type of settlement offer warranting consideration for purposes of Rule 147(3) or Practice Note Nos. 17 and 18, nor, in my view, should it for purposes of proposed Rule 147(3.1) if enacted as worded.
Comment: This case suggests that in order to obtain enhanced costs in the Tax Court based on a pre-trail settlement offer there must a some real quid pro quo in the offer; a waiver of costs would not seem to suffice. How substantial that quid pro quo must be in order to quality that offer as a true “settlement” will likely be the subject of future decisions.
[1] 2012 TCC 329.