http://decisions.fca-caf.gc.ca/fca-caf/decisions/en/item/99449/index.do 
Lyrtech RD Inc. v. The Queen (November 17, 2014 – 2014 FCA 267, Nadon, Scott (author), Boivin JJA).
Précis: The taxpayer, Lyrtech RD Inc. (“RD”), was formed in 2005 to carry on the SRED work previously carried on by Lyrtech Inc. (“Lyrtech”), a public corporation. RD was controlled by a trust (“FFL”) which was created by a subsidiary of Lyrtech. CRA denied RD investment tax credits under subsection 127(10.1) and 127.1(1) of the Income Tax Act on the basis that it was controlled by Lyrtech and therefore not a Canadian-controlled private corporation. The Tax Court held that while Lyrtech did not control RD de jure it did control RD de facto. The Federal Court of Appeal concurred with the Tax Court and dismissed the appeal with costs.
Decision: The Court of Appeal affirmed the Tax Court’s decision that de jure and de facto control could exist at the same time:
[38] Moreover, it is my opinion that the judge did not err in following the doctrine propounded by this Court in Poirier at paragraphs 28 to 30, which confirms the principle that the existence of de jure control does not preclude the possibility of another party exercising de facto control at the same time.
The Court of Appeal also affirmed the Tax Court’s decision that Lyrtech exercised de facto control over RD during the years under appeal:
[40] Paragraph 23 of Interpretation Bulletin IT 6424, published shortly after Silicon Graphics, lists the general factors to be weighed to determine whether a person has de facto control of a corporation. The trial judge applied these factors, and they can be summarized as follows:
(a) the percentage of ownership of voting shares (when such ownership is not more than 50 per cent) in relation to the holdings of other shareholders;
(b) ownership of a large debt of a corporation which may become payable on demand (unless exempted by subsection 256(3) or (6)) or a substantial investment in retractable preferred shares;
(c) shareholder agreements that include a casting vote;
(d) commercial or contractual relationships of the corporation, e.g., economic dependence on a single supplier or customer;
(e) possession of a unique expertise that is required to operate the business; and;
(f) the influence that a family member, who is a shareholder, creditor, supplier, etc., of a corporation, may have over another family member who is a shareholder of the corporation.
. . .
[41] The judge also made an exhaustive analysis of the applicable tests. He then proceeded to an in-depth review of the factual background to conclude that Lyrtech had de facto control of the appellant given the relationship between Louis Bélanger, Miguel Caron and the appellant. In addition, the judge placed particular emphasis on the appellant’s economic dependence on Lyrtech.
[42] What is relevant for R&D credits is whether there was an economic dependence or de facto control during the taxation years in issue. The fact that the appellant intended to eventually become financially autonomous is irrelevant; what is relevant is whether it was autonomous during the years at issue, failing which it was not entitled to the credits.
[43] In the matter at bar, the appellant has failed to satisfy me that the judge made a palpable and overriding error when he concluded that Lyrtech had de facto control of the appellant given Lyrtech’s economic controlling influence and the relationships binding the appellant and Lyrtech.
As a result the appeal was dismissed with costs.