http://decision.tcc-cci.gc.ca/tcc-cci/decisions/en/item/67126/index.do 
DiFlorio v. The Queen[1] (March 5, 2014) was a GST decision in which CRA alleged that Mrs. DiFlorio was a partner in her husband’s business of supplying illegal drugs to the horse racing industry over an internet web business. The court simply did not accept the Crown’s arguments and allowed her appeal:
[43] The foregoing facts, the respondent argues, differentiate the appellant’s circumstances from those in
Scott-Trask. In that case, the appellant was a schoolteacher with an independent source of income and she was not involved in her husband’s business in any way. In
Scott‑Trask, Justice McArthur found that there was no “synergy” between the parties in respect of the business. At bar, the respondent submits the degree of the appellant’s involvement in her husband’s business implies an agreement to carry on the business in common. Her husband could not have operated his business without her. He was not licenced by the ORC. She was. He did not have access to the horse owners, stable owners and, racetracks. She did. That was their “synergy” as partners. He made the drugs; she advertised and distributed them.
[44] I do not agree. The appellant was, in her own words, “a stay at home mom”. There was no evidence or suggestion to contradict this statement. Her involvement in the business is consistent with running errands, not participating in a business partnership. She handed over wrapped packages to couriers. She endorsed cheques made out to her in joint bank accounts. She trusted her husband and didn’t inquire into his activities. At trial, counsel for the respondent conceded that the foregoing activities were consistent with those of a partner in marriage, not business. Furthermore, as in Bains, the use of joint bank accounts was nothing more than a normal way of managing the family’s resources and by itself did not reflect a sharing of business profits.
[45] The respondent submits that factors iii) through v) in paragraph 42 serve to distinguish the appellant’s involvement from that of a supportive wife or conduct reflective of a good spousal relationship. They meet the “higher standard” of circumstances required to find a partnership between spouses. These activities imply that she actively advertised and distributed her husband’s drugs. In other words, she was an active participant in the business. Again, I do not agree.
[46] As to the ORC licence, the appellant could not recall having being issued one. The address listed on the appellant’s Renewal Application for the ORC licence was her husband’s work address. This is one indication that in all probability it was his doing. It is not unreasonable to expect that she simply signed what he asked her to, not realizing its legal significance. That is not unlike the situation in Scott-Trask. The same could be said for having authorized an agent to act on her behalf to claim horses. These facts simply suggest the appellant supported her former husband’s business as a partner in marriage, not as a business partner.
[47] The respondent’s position is that “someone must have been a go‑between” as between Mr. DiFlorio and his customers. The implication is that the appellant was that “someone”. But the evidence suggests there was no need for a “go-between”. The appellant’s husband operated the drug business through a website. Clients registered with his site. He pre-screened registrants to ensure they were not law enforcement. It is within reason that he ran his business from his computer without Mrs. DiFlorio’s knowledge.
[48] The appellant denied any significant involvement in the drug business without hesitation. She admitted to running errands and visiting stables. But she stated she did not know what her husband was doing. The respondent did not offer any evidence to contradict her testimony. On the whole, I will accept the evidence of Mrs. DiFlorio and allow her appeal with costs.
[1] 2014 TCC 67.