Bekesinski v. R. – TCC: Taxpayer’s evidence that he had resigned as a director accepted by court

Bill Innes on Current Tax Cases

http://decision.tcc-cci.gc.ca/tcc-cci/decisions/en/item/72842/index.do New Window

Bekesinski v. The Queen (July 28, 2014 – 2014 TCC 245 ) was a decision on director’s liability for unremitted income tax, employer contributions, interest and penalties. In an earlier reported decision the Tax Court excluded an expert report from the Crown opining on the dating of signature found on the appellant’s alleged resignation:

http://decision.tcc-cci.gc.ca/tcc-cci/decisions/en/item/66851/index.do New Window

This decision allowed the taxpayer’s appeal even though the court was not entirely comfortable with his evidence:

[51] The initial onus, which is upon the Appellant, does not require him to prove his case with complete certainty but only to demonstrate, on a balance of probabilities, that he was not a director of the Corporation at least two years prior to the Notice of Assessment being issued. Consequently, the Resignation is sufficient to demolish the Minister’s assumption that the Appellant “was the sole director” of the Corporation. Despite the Respondent’s allegation of backdating, the Respondent failed to produce evidence that would prove, on a balance of probabilities, that the Resignation is not authentic. Although the Respondent had intended to rely on expert evidence, for the reasons set out in my interim ruling, the Expert Report was excluded. The Respondent did not produce any other independent evidence, except to question the actions of the Appellant and the witnesses in an attempt to undermine the Appellant’s credibility. However, this did not produce the desired result of showing, on a balance of probabilities, that the Resignation had been backdated.

[52] I question the authenticity of the Resignation but, without the appropriate evidence before me, I must allow the appeal. The Respondent made a series of litigation choices which have resulted in my conclusion. The assumptions of fact contained in the Reply lacked the clarity and precision that may have better stated the facts specific to the Respondent’s position, that is, that the Resignation had been backdated and was not an authentic document. Due to the lack of precision, the onus on the Appellant was limited to showing he was not a director of the Corporation during the relevant period. Incorrect choices were then made respecting the content of the proposed Expert Report on ink dating that was to be used to support the Respondent’s position that the Resignation had been backdated. Some of the exhibits also lacked relevancy to the specific issue. For example, copies of corporate searches, (Exhibit R-4) had been conducted outside the taxation years in question. In addition, as pointed out during cross-examination of the Respondent’s witness, none of the documentation, supporting Ms. Barlow’s testimony that the Appellant was advised in writing that he could be facing director’s liability, was introduced into evidence

This seems to be an example of the taxpayer benefiting from a tepid performance on behalf the Minister.

The appeal was allowed but the court did not, however, allow the taxpayer his costs:

[54] Although I am allowing the appeal, I am not giving costs in this matter. It was experienced counsel before me in this appeal, so I cannot make exceptions that I might ordinarily make for newer counsel. Appellant Counsel has in the past viewed things from both sides of the table, having worked for the Crown in the earlier part of his career. In cherry-picking several paragraphs to inappropriately support its position, and without apparent reference to other relevant jurisprudence, Appellant Counsel made blatantly incorrect propositions.