Biles Estate v. Canada (National Revenue) (April 18, 2017 – 2017 FC 371, Phelan J.).
Précis: This decision involved two applications for judicial review by the same taxpayer. They were heard together. The taxpayer sought an order of mandamus to compel CRA to comply with the terms of an alleged agreement (the “Proposal”) to settle a tax dispute. The Federal Court found that the taxpayer had failed to demonstrate that there in fact was any enforceable agreement with respect to the Proposal. In any event CRA’s conduct was not unreasonable under the circumstances. Both applications were dismissed with costs.
Decision: The Court concluded that the Proposal was an attempt to resolve a complex multi-party dispute about the title to land and the taxpayer had failed to demonstrate that the parties to the Proposal were themselves in agreement with it or that CRA was ever bound by an enforceable agreement:
 With respect to “reneging” on the Proposal, before addressing whether mandamus is an available remedy and whether such relief should contain specific directions, the Applicant must establish that there was an accepted Proposal.
 As discussed earlier, even now the parties are not “ad idem” as to the Proposal and its basis. It is evident that Lori Scott saw problems with the chain of title. The Proposal emanated from the recognition that there was an auditor error that in 1998 the Trust had disposed of its interest in the Property. Establishing the real facts as to the chain of title was a necessary precondition to implementing the Proposal. The problem of what interest the Trust had in the Property in 1998 and in 2004 was addressed earlier in these Reasons.
 Therefore, absent an agreement as to the chain of title not only were the parties not in agreement about the Proposal, but the Proposal could not be legally implemented. A reassessment cannot be made contrary to law.
To the extent that CRA could be said to have decided not to proceed with the proposal, that decision was reasonable under the circumstances:
 To the extent that there was a decision not to proceed with the Proposal, as an exercise of discretion the Minister’s refusal to do so was reasonable.
Thus both applications were dismissed with costs.